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We study a model of information transmission via polling. A policy maker polls
constituents to obtain information about a payo¤ relevant state variable and then
chooses a policy that a¤ects the welfare of all in the polity. Constituents, who dif-
fer in their ideologies, receive private signals about the state variable. We nd that
when relatively few constituents are polled, full revelation can be an equilibrium; how-
ever, full revelation is impossible as the poll size grows large. Considering equilibria
in non-truth-telling strategies, when constituents and the policy maker have similar
ideologies, full information aggregation can arise in an equilibrium where constituents
endogenously sort themselves so that centrists answer truthfully while extremists bias
their responses to the pollster; in contrast, when the policy maker is ideologically
isolated, information aggregation is impossible. On a practical level, we show that
ignoring strategic behavior gives rise to biased estimators and mischaracterization of
the margin of error. Finally, we examine the properties of polls and elections and nd
that these two mechanisms give rise to di¤erent policy outcomes in equilibrium.
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The use of polls for determining policy outcomes has become an increasingly impor-
tant part of the political landscape. While polls are used for various purposes, one
critically important use of polls is as a basis for determining what policy to undertake.
Policy makers are often shy to admit that this purpose guides policy at all. President
Kennedy, for instance, famously kept his polling numbers locked away in a safe in
his brothers house rather than admit to using them. President Reagan, who is often
famously viewed as making policy based mainly on his ideology, polled obsessively,
taking polls prior to his inauguration, while he was being inaugurated, and the day
after he was inaugurated(Green, 2002, 4). More recently, both the use of polls and
those who conduct them has become more visible. The close relationship between
President Clinton and his chief pollster, Richard Morris, is an acknowledgement of
the importance of polls in determining policy outcomes in that administration. Why
are policies inuenced by polls? One possibility is that polls aggregate information
dispersed among a¤ected constituents. Another possibility is that poll results reect
ideological beliefs of constituents and thereby inform policy makers as to the polit-
ical viability of policies. Most likely, poll responses reect a combination of both
information and ideology on the part of those polled.
The relationship between information and ideology in how constituents respond to
polling leads to a fundamental question: if polls inuence policy, and they undoubt-
edly do, and constituents being polled are aware of this fact, and they undoubtedly
are, then might it be the case that those being polled respond strategically to reect
the fact that their responses shape the policy initiatives proposed by political lead-
ership? In this paper, we study how strategic motives a¤ect the information content
of polls and, ultimately, policy outcomes.
To x ideas, consider the situation of the Oregon Legislative Assembly in 1999.1
That body was contemplating a change in the states minimum wage law to lower the
minimum wage for tipped workers and certain younger employees. The policy choice
of the Assembly is continuous policies might range from the status quo to a complete
repeal of the minimum wage as well as everything in between. As economists at the
Oregon Employment Department averred, predicting the economic impact of changes
in minimum wage policy is extremely di¢ cult. Thus, to obtain information about
the economic e¤ects of the proposed policy change, the Assembly sought comment
from various interested parties. Many of these parties reported back polling data to
provide this information. For instance, a poll conducted by the Oregon Restaurant
Association o¤ered evidence about the economic impact that the statescurrent min-
imum wage was having on restaurateurs. Other groups o¤ered national polling data
about both the desirability and impact of the minimum wage on workers and rms.
Of course, in studying this polling data, the Assembly had to bear in mind that,
1The description of the policy process undertaken by the Oregon Legislative Assembly draws
heavily from Thompson and Braun (1999).
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while there was undoubtedly a factual component to the poll results, there was also
an ideological component. For instance, the dataprovided by the Oregon restau-
rateurs in their poll responses di¤ered (in a predictable way) with statistics available
to the Assembly from other sources. It is also not hard to imagine that the reports
of workers a¤ected by the possible policy change were also inuenced by their ideo-
logical views about the appropriate policy. In short, poll responses reected a mix of
information and ideology and, at least in the case of the restaurateurs, were clearly
strategic.
The main results of the paper are as follows:
1. When the number of constituents polled is relatively small and the ideology
of the populace is relatively homogeneous, then the informational component
of the poll dominates truthful information revelation is an equilibrium. Since
the size of the poll is relatively small, however, the amount of information the
policy maker obtains is limited.
2. As the number of constituents polled grows large, the amount of information
obtainable by the policy maker increases. Unfortunately, it is precisely under
these circumstances that ideological e¤ects start to dominate poll responses.
Indeed, we show there is a nite upper bound on the size of a poll where
truthful information revelation is an equilibrium; put di¤erently, information
aggregation via truth-telling strategies is impossible in large polls.
3. Whether polls aggregate information under non truth-telling strategies depends
on the distribution of ideologies in the polity. Under fairly mild conditions on
the distribution of the ideologies of constituents, we show full information ag-
gregation can arise in an equilibrium where those polled (endogenously) sort
themselves into centrists, who answer truthfully, and extremists, who bias their
answers based on their ideology. As the size of the poll grows large, the ideolog-
ical bounds on centrism converge to the median ideology; that is, the fraction
of centrists among those polled is vanishingly small. However, the number of
centrists grows without bound, and full information aggregation occurs in the
limit. (In an extension of the model, we show that information does not aggre-
gate when there are no constituents whose ideologies lies within a neighborhood
of the ideology of the policy maker.)
4. On a practical level, we study how the presence of strategic motives when
answering poll questions a¤ects statistical inference from the results. We show
that ignoring strategic motives and using classical statistical inference leads
to biased estimators of the state variable as well as a mischaracterization of
condence intervals for the value of the state variable. We o¤er estimators that
correct for strategic e¤ects in polls.
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5. Finally, we show that policy outcomes arising from a poll typically di¤er from
those obtained when policies are determined by voting, as in a referendum.
Indeed, when the policy space is constrained to be binary (thus allowing for
meaningful comparisons between the two mechanisms), voting in a referendum
will typically convey some information held by constituents. In contrast, when
policies are determined following a poll it may be impossible for constituents
to credibly convey information in any equilibrium. Thus, the two mechanisms
give rise to di¤erent policy outcomes in equilibrium.
While the motivating example discussed the use of polls in policy making in Ore-
gon. Many other situations of decision making following polls share similar features.
One possibility is that the inuence of the poll on policy might be indirect. For in-
stance, the Association for Children of New Jersey commissioned a poll to determine
the appropriateness of levels of school funding across the state. The goal of the As-
sociation was to use the data to a¤ect policy making regarding education funding in
New Jersey. Obviously, theres a factual component of interest the studentsand
parentsexperiences in the schools and an ideological component bound up in views
about property taxes and state sponsored education. Similarly, the Wisconsin As-
sociation of Railroad Passengers and various other bodies in the Midwest conducted
a series of polls to a¤ect policy concerning regional rail service in the Midwest. A
fundamental informational question of interest to policy makers are the likely usage
patterns of any rail expansion, yet obviously ideological views about the importance
of mass transit are reected in poll responses. Outside the context of politics, con-
sensus earnings forecasts of sell-side equity analysts can be viewed as the result of a
poll. Clearly, there is an informational component a rms expected earnings per
share of interest to investors; however, in developing a forecast for inclusion in the
poll, an individual analyst might choose to shade his or her views depending on the
prospects of investment banking business with the client company or whether the an-
alysts rm has a long or short position in the rms stock (see Michaely and Womack
1999). Thus, the key trade-o¤explored in the present paper the interaction between
information and ideology is also present in the analyst setting.
While we focus on the informational aspect of polling, obviously polls are con-
ducted for a variety of reasons. Political leaders use polls to test words, phrases, and
ideas that they might use to generate public support for their policies. Pre-election
polls serve to inform the electorate about the relative chances of the candidates and
thereby coordinate voters on the candidates that are most likely to win in the elec-
tion. In a political campaigns, polls can help candidates decide how to deploy their
scarce advertising and human resources; and, political leaders gather information
about the issues concerning the public so that they can respond with appropriate
policies. Our model and results are appropriate for analyzing situations where the
last reason suggested for polling is most salient.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 places this paper within
the context of the broader literature. Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 studies
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equilibria involving truth-telling by all of those polled. Section 5 examines equilibria
involving non truth-telling strategies and studies their limit properties. In section
6, we discuss how strategic motives a¤ect classical statistical inferences drawn from
poll data and how to correct for these. Section 7 extends the polling model. Among
other things, in this section, we compare policies determined by polling outcomes
with those obtained through referenda. Section 8 concludes. Proofs not appearing in
the text are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Related literature
Our paper is related to the literature on (costless) strategic information transmission.
Crawford and Sobel (1982) were the rst to address this issue within the context of
a communication game between an perfectly informed expert and an uninformed
decision-maker. Their work has been extended in various directions: some work, for
instance, has examined the e¤ect of multiple experts with perfect information on
the communication game (e.g., Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987 and 1989; Krishna and
Morgan 2001a and 2001b; Ottaviani and Sorensen 2001; and Battaglini 2002); other
work has considered the e¤ect of multiple experts but with noisy information (e.g.,
Austen-Smith 1993; Li, Rosen, and Suen 2001; Wolinsky 2002; and Battaglini 2004).
The main nding in this literature is that preference divergence between experts and
the policy maker leads to information losses. Battaglini (2004) considers the case
where there is an arbitrary number of experts with noisy multi-dimensional private
information. He nds that although truth-telling is never an equilibrium, policy
outcomes converge to the full information benchmark in the limit. In much of this
literature, preferences of the experts and the policy maker are assumed to be common
knowledge.2
Our paper is also related to the literature on strategic voting and information
aggregation in elections.3 Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) point out that truthful
voting is not generally an equilibrium, while Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) show
that information does not aggregate under various voting rules. In these models, all
voters have identical policy preferences conditional on the underlying state.4 Fed-
dersen and Pesendorfer (1997) establish that truth telling is not an equilibrium but
information does fully aggregate in a model of diverse preferences. Like our model,
voters are privately informed about both the state and their ideology; however, un-
like our model, the policy space is binary. All of the above models share the feature
2One exception is Morgan and Stocken (2003) who consider a single expert case where the
preferences of the expert are private information.
3See Young (1988) for a statement of the classic early intuition on information aggregation in
elections the Condorcet Jury Theorem.
4See also Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996), who allow for the quality of information of con-
stituents to di¤er, as well as Persico (2004), who endogenizes both the policy rule and quality of
information obtained by constituents.
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that there is commitment to a xed policy response as a function of the voting rule
used. Razin (2003) relaxes this assumption in a model where voters have identical
preferences by allowing an elected candidate to select policy following the vote. He
shows that information does not fully aggregate. Somewhat related to our work is a
literature studying polls prior to elections (see, for instance, Austen-Smith 1990; Fey
1997; and Coughlan 2000). Here, interest is in how the information derived from a
poll a¤ects voting. Finally, our work is somewhat related to Lohmann (1993), who
studies a signaling model of political demonstrations.5
3 Model
When polls are conducted to gather information about the appropriate policy, those
a¤ected by the policy the constituents may have ideological di¤erences about the
appropriate policy choice. That is, given the same information, individuals may dif-
fer in their determination of the appropriate policy because an individuals ideology
interacts with his information to produce policy choices. A polled constituent an-
ticipates that his response to poll questions will have an e¤ect, even if only a small
one, on the chosen policy, and this might alter his response. Of course, the policy
maker must recognize this possibility when interpreting poll results and translating
them into policy. In this section, we introduce a model of polling that captures these
features.
A polity consists of a continuum of individuals. Let the cumulative distribution




denote the distribution of ideologies for this popu-
lation of individuals. Without loss of generality, suppose the median of the ideological
distribution occurs at b = 0. It is commonly known that the policy maker has the
median ideology.6 All others in the population are constituents of the policy maker.
The task of the policy maker is to select a policy, y 2 R. The selected policy a¤ects
the welfare of all of the constituents in the polity. The welfare e¤ect of a given policy
on a constituent also depends on the constituents ideology and the realization of the
state variable, , which is drawn from a Beta distribution with known parameters
; . As we shall see, the Beta distribution has attractive properties for performing
analysis of the polling problem while at the same time o¤ering considerable modeling
exibility.
While the constituents are uninformed about the realized state, each constituent i
receives a conditionally independent private signal si 2 f0; 1g that is correlated with
the state: Specically, conditional on state , a constituent i receives the signal si = 1
with probability  and the signal si = 0 with complementary probability.
5Grossman and Helpman (2001) o¤er an excellent summary of some of the key insights from both
strands of research on the role of special interest groups in the policy making process.
6 While we have assumed this exogenously, one could readily derive it as a consequence of a
standard voting model where votes are cast prior to any information about the state being realized.
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Unfortunately, the policy maker does not observe the state nor receive a signal
about it. Instead, the policy maker must rely on a poll to obtain information about
the state.7 Before choosing a policy, the policy maker conducts a poll consisting of a
commonly known (nite) sample size of n of the constituents numbered i = 1; 2; :::; n.8
Each polled constituent i simultaneously sends a binary message mi 2 f0; 1g. The
message sent does not directly enter any constituents payo¤ function nor is the
message in any way constrained by constituent is signal or ideology the message
is pure cheap talk. The policy maker learns the count of the total number k of
constituents sending the message m = 1; we shall refer to k as the outcome of the
poll.
Since individuals obtain conditionally independent binary signals about the state,
if each constituent truthfully reveals his signal (i.e., reportsmi = si), the poll captures
all information relevant to the policy makers choice. Moreover, as the size of the
poll becomes arbitrarily large, the outcome of the poll divided by its size (i.e., k=n)
provides an arbitrarily good estimate of .
After learning the results of the poll, the policy maker selects a policy, and pay-
o¤s are realized. An individuals payo¤ function is given by U (y; ; b); that is, an
individuals payo¤s depends on the policy, the state, and the individuals ideology.
To conserve on notation, we simply omit the b argument from the payo¤ function
for the policy maker. We assume that U11 < 0 and that there exists a unique nite
policy, y, that maximizes this expression for each  and b: We also assume that in
higher states, higher policies are preferred by all individuals, that is U12 > 0. Fur-
ther, higher policies are likewise preferred by individuals with higher values of the
ideology parameter, b, that is U13 > 0.9 Individuals with ideologies b < 0 are thought
of as left-biasedrelative to the policy maker while those with ideologies b > 0 are
thought of as right-biased. For a given state, a left-biased individual prefers a lower
policy than the policy maker while a right-biased individual prefers a higher policy.
The posterior beliefs of the policy maker after learning that a poll of n constituents
had outcome k is given by the cumulative distribution function G (j hn; ki) :Where
appropriate, we shall use g (j hn; ki) to denote the probability density function asso-
ciated with G (j hn; ki). The notation hn; ki denotes a poll of size n receiving support
k:Given these beliefs, the necessary and su¢ cient condition for the policy maker to
7 It is easier to analyze the model if we assume that the policy maker does not receive a signal
about the state. Since we are interested in information aggregation properties of large polls, the
informational e¤ect of this assumption is negligible. The model, however, generalizes to the case
where the policy maker obtains a signal.
8 The common knowledge assumption is for simplicity. Alternatively, one could endogenize the
size of the poll by assuming a constant marginal cost, c, to the policy maker per person contacted
in a poll. The analysis below would be identical in a sequential equilibrium where the equilibrium
number of individuals polled, n; is a pure strategy for the policy maker.
9 These assumptions are standard in the costless information transmission literature (see Craw-
ford and Sobel 1982).
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choose an optimal policy, y (k), isZ 1
0
U1 (y; ) dG (j hn; ki) = 0: (1)
We shall sometimes consider a special case of payo¤s that occurs when individuals
su¤er quadratic losses associated with the deviation of the chosen policy from an
individuals ideal policy.10 Specically,
U (y; ; b) =   (y   ( + b))2
In this quadratic loss specication, the solution to equation (1) becomes y (k) =
EG [j hn; ki] ; that is, the chosen policy is set equal to the policy makers point esti-
mate of the ideal policy given his information.11
The time line of the game and notation is summarized in Figure 1.
We study perfect Bayesian equilibria of this game. In such equilibria: (i) the policy
maker uses Bayesrule where possible in determining his posterior beliefs about the
state; (ii) given beliefs, the policy is chosen optimally; (iii) given beliefs about the
strategies of the other players, each constituent chooses a message to maximize his
expected payo¤.12
4 Truthful Revelation in Polls
In this section, we study conditions in which truth-telling honest reporting of ones
signal is an equilibrium. Recall that when constituents are non-strategic in their
polling responses, then, as the size of the poll grows arbitrarily large, the policy
makers estimate of the state becomes arbitrarily precise. In other words, the infor-
mation distributed across the polity is fully aggregated in a poll. In contrast, when
constituents are strategic and their ideological preferences are not identical to those of
the policy maker, we nd a constituent might seek to inuence policy choices by mis-
representing his signal in the poll. In particular, we establish that, regardless of the
ideological distribution of the constituents, it is never the case that truth-telling by all
polled constituents comprises an equilibrium once the number of constituents polled
10 This specication is also standard in the costless information transmission literature (see Craw-
ford and Sobel 1982) Typically, it is coupled with the assumption that the state, ; is uniformly
distributed; thus giving rise to the so-called uniform-quadraticcase, which is widely used in ap-
plications (e.g., Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, 1989; Krehbiel 1990; Grossman and Helpman 2001; and
Krishna and Morgan 2001a, b):
11 Following Dessein (2002), it is straightforward to generalize the quadratic specication as fol-
lows: If one lets payo¤s be U (y; ; b) =  

  (y   ( + b))2

where  () is an arbitrary increasing
function, then all of our results obtained for the quadratic loss specication straightforwardly gen-
eralize to this case as well.
12 This solution concept corresponds exactly to the notion of legislative equilibrium used in
Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987, 1989).
8
becomes su¢ ciently large. Thus, the interaction between information and ideology
makes information aggregation in polls (through truthful revelation) an impossibility.
To establish the result, suppose the policy maker conducts a poll of size n and
believes (correctly in equilibrium) that all of those polled are telling the truth. The
posterior beliefs of the policy maker for a poll with outcome k are Beta distributed
with parameters k +  and n   k + : The next two lemmas establish structural
properties of any truth-telling equilibrium; the proofs of these lemmas are contained
in the Appendix. Lemma 1 establishes the intuitive property that higher outcomes,
k, of the poll lead to higher equilibrium policies, y (k). Lemma 2 shows that as the
size of the poll increases, the e¤ect of any polled constituent on the policy decreases.
Lemma 1 If all polled constituents reveal truthfully, then y (k + 1) > y (k) :
Lemma 2 Fix " > 0: If all polled constituents reveal truthfully, then for n large
enough, y (k + 1)  y (k) < ":
We now use these structural properties an equilibrium with truthful revelation to
prove the main result in this section:
Proposition 1 For a su¢ ciently large sample of constituents, truthful reporting is
never an equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that truth-telling is an equilibrium. Then it must





























wherem0i 6= si and where Es i; [] is the expectation over all other polled constituents
signals, s i; and over the distribution of the state, :
In particular, suppose without loss of generality that bi > 0 and si = 0: Then the






sj = kjsi = 0
!Z 1
0
(U (y (k) ; ; bi)  U (y (k + 1) ; ; bi)) g (j hn; ki) d  0:
Since U13 > 0, it follows that for every kZ 1
0
(U (y (k) ; ; bi)  U (y (k) + "; ; bi)) g (j hn; ki) d < 0
for " > 0 small enough.
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By Lemma 1, y (k) < y (k + 1), and by Lemma 2; for any " > 0, y (k + 1) 






sj = kjsi = 0
!Z 1
0
(U (y (k) ; ; bi)  U (y (k + 1) ; ; bi)) g (j hn; ki) d < 0;
which contradicts the claim that truth-telling is an equilibrium. An analogous ar-
gument shows that a polled constituent with preference parameter bj < 0 has a
protable deviation when receiving a signal sj = 1:
Proposition 1 highlights that, in general, information aggregation via truth-telling
in polls is inconsistent with equilibrium behavior. Indeed, there is a nite upper
bound to the size of a poll where truth-telling is incentive compatible. The key
observation is that in large polls, since an individual constituents inuence on policy
is relatively small, his incentive to misrepresent his signal in the direction of his
ideological preference is large.
In determining how to respond to a poll, a constituent lacks considerable infor-
mation about the policy e¤ect of such misrepresentation. In particular, an individual
constituent knows only his own signal; the signals of all others polled are unknown.
Thus, a constituent contemplating the deviation is uncertain about the exact pol-
icy e¤ect of misrepresenting his signal. Indeed, one possibility is that, by deviating,
the e¤ect on policy could be to overshootthe constituents ideal policy. That is,
a constituent might prefer a more right leaning policy than the policy maker, but
policies that are too far to the right relative to the state are not desirable for either
the constituent or the policy maker. Proposition 1 illustrates the equilibrium e¤ects
of the trade-o¤ between inuencing policy choice and possibly overshooting the
desired policy.
It is important to contrast this strategic e¤ect with those typically arising in voting
models. In voting models, the strategic dimension centers on the chances that a voter
will be pivotal and thus change the chosen candidate/policy/platform discretely. Of
course, the odds of this event occurring are small in large elections, but, since an
individual has no e¤ect on policy in any other circumstance, the pivotal event looms
large strategically. In contrast, a constituents response to a poll always a¤ects the
policy. When the poll is relatively small, a constituents e¤ect on policy is relatively
large and overshootingthe optimal policy is a key concern. As the size of the poll
grows large, an individuals e¤ect on policy shrinks and overshooting ceases to be a
serious concern. Without this discipline, incentives to reveal truthfully break down.
Proposition 1 highlights how the interaction between ideology and information
precludes the possibility of truth-telling equilibria in large polls. To get a sense of
the potential informational signicance of the e¤ect, it is useful to study a version
of the quadratic loss specication of the model which will enable us to explicitly
characterize the largest size truth-telling poll. We nd that the size of polls need not
be very large before truth-telling equilibria are ruled out. Furthermore, the loss of
10
information associated with limits on the size of the largest poll where truth-telling
is an equilibrium increase linearly with the standard deviation of the distribution of
ideologies in the polity.
Consider the following special case of the model, which we shall refer to as the
quadratic loss with binary ideology specication. Suppose that payo¤s are quadratic
and that those polled have bias bi, which is equally likely to be  b or b where b > 0;
that is, the degree of bias is identical for all constituents but the direction of the bias
varies. This specication is especially useful in studying ideological heterogeneity
in that the bias parameter, b; is equal to the standard deviation of the ideological
distribution.
Given the posterior beliefs of the policy maker and equation (1), the policy chosen
under truth-telling in a poll of n constituents with outcome k is





With this structure, we can then nd a closed-form solution, the proof of which is
given in the Appendix, for the largest size poll where truth-telling is an equilibrium.
Formally,
Proposition 2 In the quadratic loss with binary ideology specication, the largest









where bxc denotes the integer component of x:
The importance of strategic e¤ects on the size of a poll where truth-telling is an
equilibrium may be readily seen in Figure 2. This gure denes the upper bound poll
size under truth-telling when the state is distributed uniformly. As Figure 2 reveals,
when the standard deviation of the ideological distribution, b, exceeds 0:016, then the
largest poll where truth-telling is an equilibrium is at most 30.
5 Centrist-Extremist Equilibria in Polls
Having shown that truthful revelation is not an equilibrium when large numbers of
constituents are polled, we now study a class of equilibria that we refer to these
equilibria as centrist-extremist equilibria. In a centrist-extremist equilibrium, which
is characterized by a pair (bl; br) where bl  br; all constituents with ideology b < bl
report m = 0 regardless of their signal, all constituents with ideology b > br report
m = 1 regardless of their signal, and constituents with ideology b 2 [bl; br] report
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truthfully. That is, constituents with ideologies lying outside the bounds [bl; br] are
extremists in the sense that they always report a signal favoring their ideology; in
contrast, those constituents with ideologies lying inside the bounds [bl; br] are centrists
who report truthfully. This class of equilibria have a number of useful and intuitive
properties: this class nests both truthful revelation (i.e. bl =b, br = b) and babbling
(i.e., bl = br = 0); they are also monotonic in ideology which is consistent with the
U13 > 0 assumption. In election contexts, the study of centrist-extremist equilibria
is fairly standard.13
To analyze the informational and statistical properties of centrist-exptremist equi-
libria requires that we place additional structure on the model: specically, we assume
that preferences are of the quadratic loss form and that the ideological distribution
has a positive density on [ 1; 1] and is symmetric around b = 0. The assumption
on the support of the ideological distribution implies that truth-telling is not an
equilibrium regardless of the size of the poll.
5.1 Polls with Stratied Sampling
First, we consider a special case of the model what we refer to as a "stratied
poll". This special case is useful in that it permits easy construction of closed form
solutions to centrist-extremist equilibria in polls. Moreover, as we shall see, all of
the informational and statistical properties of this model are true more generally but
more easily understood in the present context.
Typically, polls are conducted in a fashion that stratiesthe sample to reect the
ideological distribution of the polity. We model a stratied poll as follows: Suppose
that when (an odd number) of n individuals are polled, one can arrange the ideological
preferences of the constituents in increasing order such that the ideological preferences








Notice that the pollster does not know the ideological preference of a polled con-
stituent but does know the exact ideological distribution of the set of n polled con-
stituents. There are a number of practical ways such stratication is achieved (see
Voter Contact Services 1994). For instance, one can poll on the basis of zip codes.
Since zip code information combined with past voting records is a reliable indicator
of ideology for those living in that zip code, one can then create a stratied poll
with an ideological distribution mirroring that of the polity. As the number of polled
individuals grows arbitrarily large, i.e., n ! 1; the ideological distribution of the
polled individuals will converge to the ideological distribution of the polity under a
stratied poll (as well as under an unstratied poll).
13See, for instance, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997).
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We also suppose that the constituent ideologies are uniformly distributed on
[ 1; 1] :Thus, the ideology of polled constituent i is
bi =
2 (i  1)  (n  1)
(n  1)
for i = 1;..., n:14 Finally, we assume that the parameters (; ) of the underlying
state distribution are natural numbers.
We construct a symmetric centrist-extremist equilibrium where centrists reveal
information truthfully whereas extremists answer the poll in a direction that is con-
sistent with their ideology; that is, a left-wing extremist constituent with preference
parameter bi < 0 always reports mi = 0 and a right-wing extremist with preferences
bj > 0 always reports mj = 1: The equilibrium construction then consists of char-
acterizing the preference bounds on left and right-wing extremism given the policy
maker behaves optimally.
Before proceeding, it is useful to observe that in a poll of n constituents where
c constituents are known to report truthfully, while  always report m = 1, and the
remaining  = n  c   constituents always report m = 0, the policy makers beliefs
in this case is Beta distributed with parameters k   +  and c  (k   ) + :
In terms of centrist-extremist equilibria in stratied polls, suppose constituents
with indices 1 to l  1 are left-wing extremists, those with indices l to r are centrists,
and those with indices r + 1 to n are right-wing extremists. Symmetry requires
l = n   r + 1: In such an equilibrium, the policy maker correctly interprets a size n
poll having outcome k as one receiving k (n  r) reports of si = 1 from n 2 (n  r)
centrist constituents.
In such an equilibrium, the optimal policy for the policy maker is:
y (k) =
k   (n  r) + 
n  2 (n  r) + +  :
Notice that
y (k + 1)  y (k) = 1
n  2 (n  r) + +  :
which is independent of the poll outcome k: This proves extremely useful for eval-
uating incentive constraints and allows simple construction of symmetric centrist






for j = 1; 2; ::;1:
14The formulation of the distribution of ideologies for the model of polls with stratied sampling
is identical to the preference specication used in Lohmann (1993)
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Proposition 3 In a stratied poll of size nj, there exists a symmetric centrist-




(j   I) + j (j   I) + 1
The proof is contained in the Appendix. Next, we examine the limiting properties
of this sequence. Notice that, the number of centrists associated with a poll of size
nj and the associated-centrist extremist equilibrium is
cj = nj   2 (nj   rj)
= j   I + 1:







j   I + 1
2 (j2   jI) + 1
= 0;
while the number of centrists becomes arbitrarily large (limj!1 cj ! 1). This last
property implies that information fully aggregates. To summarize, we have shown
that
Proposition 4 In a stratied poll, there exists a sequence of poll sizes nj, and an
associated symmetric centrist-extremist equilibrium, in which full information aggre-
gation results in the limit even though the fraction of centrists in the poll goes to
zero.
To gain some intuition for the result, it is useful to examine the nature of the
endogenous bounds on extremism. For the jth element of the sequence, the index
number of the right-most centrist is rj = 12 (j   I) + j (j   I) + 1: The percentile of








(j   I) + j (j   I) + 1
2 (j2   jI) + 1 :





: Thus, the ideologies of the centrists collapse to that
of the median individual as the size of the poll grows large. This collapse occurs
because the policy change from reporting mi = 1 versus mi = 0 becomes arbitrarily
small as the poll size grows large, and consequently, the incentive constraints require
correspondingly smaller values of bias. While the ideological bounds on the centrists
are collapsing in the limit, the number of constituents polled between the interval of
ideologies, [l; r] is becoming large as the poll increases in size. Thus, there is a race
between the speed at which the ideological bounds collapse and the increase in the
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number of centrists between the bounds.15 Proposition 4 shows that, regardless of the
parameters of the state distribution, the ideological bounds on centrism collapse at a
slower rate than the number of centrists increases. Accordingly, while full information
aggregation results in the limit, convergence occurs relatively slowly. In particular:




5.2 Polls with Random Sampling
In the previous section, we made a number of assumptions about the polling technol-
ogy to obtain the precise equilibrium construction in Proposition 3. In this section,
we relax many of these assumptions and show that the informational features high-
lighted above continue to hold; of course, the cost of relaxing these assumptions is
that a construction of an equilibrium sequence is no longer possible. Specically, we
assume that polled constituents are drawn randomly from the underlying population,
and we drop the restrictions that ideology be uniformly distributed and that  and
 be natural numbers. Throughout the remainder of the paper, we shall refer to this
framework as the model of polls with random sampling.
Before proceeding it is useful to introduce some additional notation. Consider
a poll of size n and an associated centrist-extremist equilibrium (bl; br) : We may
equivalently represent this equilibrium by a pair (qc; qr) where
qr = 1  F (br)
qc = F (br)  F (bl)
the notation qt describes the quantile measure of constituents of type t 2 fc; rg in the
population. Second, we say that a centrist-extremist equilibrium is non-degenerate
when qc > 0. We rst establish that a non-degenerate centrist-extremist equilibrium
always exists.
As usual, to show that a non-degenerate centrist-extremist exists requires that
the policy maker choose policies optimally after learning the outcome of the poll,
and, given optimal policy making, that constituents prefer to report according to
their type (centrist, left-wing extremist, or right-wing extremist) rather than deviate.
15 A similar raceoccurs in a recent paper by Taylor and Yildirim (2005). In a model of costly
voting, they show that full information aggregation occurs even though the fraction of voters casting
votes goes to zero in the limit.
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Given quadratic preferences, the optimal policy following poll outcome k is

















k c1 (1  qc   qr)n k c0  (+c1) (+c0) (++c0+c1)
Given the optimal policy rule, a non-degenerate centrist-extremist equilibrium is
a solution to the following pair of incentive compatibility constraints:
1. A constituent with ideology br and a signal s = 0 must be indi¤erent between
reporting honestly and lying:
n 1X
k=0
(Pr [hn  1; ki js = 0] (E [j hn; k + 1i]  E [j hn; ki])
 (E [j hn; k + 1i] + E [j hn; ki]  2E [j hn  1; ki ; s = 0]))
 2F 1 (1  qr)
= 0 (2)
2. A constituent with ideology bl and a signal s = 1 must be indi¤erent between
reporting honestly and lying:
n 1X
k=0
(Pr [hn  1; ki js = 1] (E [j hn; k + 1i]  E [j hn; ki])
 ( E [j hn; k + 1i]  E [j hn; ki] + 2E [j hn  1; ki ; s = 1]))
+2F 1 (1  qr   qc)
= 0 (3)
We are now in a position to prove that a non-degenerate centrist-extremist equi-
librium always exists in our model.
Proposition 5 In a poll with random sampling, a non-degenerate centrist-extremist
equilibrium exists.
Next, we study the information aggregation properties of non-degenerate centrist-
extremist equilibria when sampling is random. As we shall see, the intuition and
the main properties of polls as the sample grows large are the same under random
sampling as under stratied polling. In some sense, this might not be surprising since
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the distribution of ideologies under random and stratied sampling both converge in
distribution to the underlying ideological distribution of the populace.
For a xed poll size n, dene qc;n to be the supremum of the set of values of
qc arising in a centrist-extremist equilibrium; let qr;n be the value of qr associated
with qc: Notice that if qc;n remained xed as the size of the poll grew large, then a
constituent would correctly realize that his reporting choice would have little e¤ect
on the policy. Moreover, since the information contained in the outcome of the poll
allows the policy maker to better infer the state, there is little chance that by lying
about his signal, a constituent would induce an action that does not enhance his
payo¤. As a result, constituents whose ideologies lie near the boundary of centrism
(i.e. constituents with ideologies close to bl or br) will be increasingly tempted to lie.
As a consequence, for reasons analogous to the stratied sampling case, the bounds bl
and br must tend toward zero as the size of the poll increases; that is, an increasingly
small fraction of the populace will act as centrists.
We formalize this intuition in the following proposition:
Proposition 6 In a poll with random sampling, as the size of the poll grows ar-
bitrarily large, the fraction of constituents telling the truth goes to zero. Formally,
limn!1 fqc;ng = 0.
Notice that, while we examined the sequence of equilibria containing the largest
fraction of centrists, the limit result above implies that all non-degenerate centrist-
extremist equilibria converge to q = 0 in the limit.
What happens to information aggregation? As we show in the next proposition,
information fully aggregates even under a poll with a random sample. To gain some
intuition for why this is the case, consider the converse: suppose information did not
fully aggregate. In that case, a constituents own signal, even after having observed
the outcome of the poll, leads to a shift in his posterior beliefs about the state. That
is, there is a di¤erence in the posterior beliefs of the constituent and those of the policy
maker when both observe the polls outcome. Constituents with ideologies close to
those of the policy maker prefer to tell the truth and shift the policy in the direction
of the state rather than to lie and shift the policy away from it. As the sample
size increases with out bound, there are an innite number of these constituents,
which implies information must, in fact, fully aggregate to avoid this contradiction.
In short, while there might appear to be a "race" between the speed at which the
bounds on centrism collapse and the number of centrists lying inside these bounds,
the above intuition shows that the race is always decided in favor of full information
aggregation so long as there is a positive density of constituent ideologies in an epsilon
neighborhood around the ideology of the policy maker. We return to this intuition
in section 5 and show that, absent this condition, information aggregation need not
result.
The following proposition formalizes the above intuition.
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Proposition 7 As the size of the poll grows arbitrarily large, the number of con-
stituents telling the truth becomes arbitrarily large. Formally, limn!1 n fqc;ng =1.
Corollary 1 Information fully aggregates.
6 Statistical Properties of Polls
Suppose a policy maker were to analyze poll results using classical statistics while
ignoring strategic e¤ects. For instance, in a poll to assess the appropriateness of
school funding in New Jersey, the Monmouth University Polling Institute, who were
commissioned to conduct the poll, surveyed 803 New Jersey residents that were 18
years or older in October 2006. To analyze the results of their polls, the Institute
relied on classical statistics to derive condence intervals. Specically, they report a
margin of error attributable to sampling of plus or minus three and a half percentage
points based on a underlying Bernoulli model with a parameter equal to one half.16
Pollsters typically recognize that in addition to sampling error, bias might be
introduced thorough selection issues the survey was based on telephone interviews
necessitating respondents have telephones and framing e¤ects bias attributable to
question wording. That being said, we know of no cases where polling organizations
have attempted to correct condence intervals to account for the possibility that
respondents might answer strategically. As we highlighted above, it is precisely in
large polls, where sampling error is small and condence bounds apparently tight,
where strategic motives play the largest role. Thus, a policy maker needs to recognize
these strategic motives to draw correct inferences from polling data.
6.1 Polls with Stratied Sampling
To illustrate how the presence of strategic behavior a¤ects the inferences drawn from
a poll, consider Figure 3. This gure illustrates the most informative symmetric
centrist-extremist equilibrium when a stratied poll consisting of 261 constituents is
conducted. In the gure, the parameter of interest, , is uniformly distributed. Using
Proposition 4, one can show there is a symmetric centrist-extremist equilibrium where
11 of those polled are centrists and the remainder are extremists; thus, the outcome
of the poll, k, can range from 125 to 136. This range is illustrated on the x-axis of the
gure. The conventional sample mean, ̂, is simply the outcome of the poll divided
by the size of the poll, ̂ = k
n
. As the graph shows, the sample mean is increasing,
but given the large number of extremists in the polling populace, not surprisingly ̂
always lies in the neighborhood of 1=2. Since the results of a poll are approximately
normally distributed when the sample size n is large, the condence interval then
16The margin of error associated with a 95 percent condence level and a (large) random sample
of size n is 1:96
p
 (1  ) =n; the margin of error that is typically reported assumes  = 1=2.
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consists of adding and subtracting z=2 times the standard error to and from ̂; the
gure depicts a  = :95 condence interval. Notice that, because the size of the
sample is large, the condence interval fairly tightly brackets the sample mean.
The constituents do not all truthfully reveal their information. Indeed, there are
only eleven constituents the centrists telling the truth in the poll. This has two
implications: First, it implies that a small variation in the outcomes of the poll lead to
large di¤erences in the sample mean once one recognizes that the e¤ective sample size
is 11 rather than 261. This di¤erence can be readily seen in Figure 3 by comparing the
conventional sample mean to the adjusted sample mean ̂
0
= (k   (n  r)) =c, where
the term adjusted refers to the fact that strategic motives are recognized. Notice that
the adjusted sample mean, which is the minimum variance unbiased estimator for
, is much more steeply sloped as a function of the outcome of the poll than is the
conventional sample mean. Second, since the e¤ective sample size is 11 as opposed
to 261, when the conventional and adjusted sample means are relatively close to one
another, such as when k = 130, the standard error and hence the condence interval
is much wider once one accounts for the extremists in the sample population. On the
other hand, for extreme outcomes, such as k  127 or k  134, the adjusted standard
error becomes extremely small and hence the condence interval for the adjusted
statistics is tighter than when one does not account for strategic motives. Indeed,
for these values, the conventional and adjusted condence intervals do not overlap at
all. Further, the presence of strategic behavior dramatically e¤ects the polls margin
of error: when the pollster ignores the fact that respondents behave strategically,
the error attributable to the sample is plus or minus six percentage points with 95
percent condence; in contrast, when the pollster recognizes that respondents behave
strategically, the error is plus or minus thirty percentage points with 95 percent
condence!
In the remainder of the section, we show that for the model of polls with strat-
ied sampling, the conventional sample mean is biased toward moderate values of
 compared to the adjusted sample mean. We also establish that the conventional
condence bands are too narrow for moderate values of k and too wide for extreme
values of k:
Bias
We begin by studying the relationship between the conventional sample mean
and the unknown parameter, : Recall that the sample mean of a poll consisting of n





To see that it is biased, x a value of  and using the denitions of nj; rj; and cj
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>  when  < 1
2
; and vice-versa when
 > 1
2
; thus, the sample mean has positive bias when the state is low and negative bias





is determined in a fashion that fails to recognize that only a portion of the
constituents surveyed truthfully reveal their signal to the pollster (i.e., the centrists).




as an estimate of .
We have shown:
Proposition 8 For large polls, the sample mean ̂ is biased.
Condence Intervals
We now consider the accuracy of the sample mean as an estimator of the unknown
parameter  by constructing condence intervals. When one ignores strategic e¤ects,






which is approximately standard normal for n su¢ ciently large. The -percentage




where z=2 is a standard normal z statistic. The
width of this condence interval is
w = 2z=2
vuut ̂ 1  ̂
n
.
Because ̂ is biased and the sample size n is e¤ectively overstated in a centrist-
extremist equilibrium, the test statistic Z yields an incorrect condence interval. If













and the width of the adjusted condence interval is
w0 = 2z=2
vuut k (n r)c 1  k (n r)c 
c
:
Observe that when r = n; that is, when all of those polled reveal truthfully, the
conventional and adjusted condence intervals are identical for all poll outcomes.
However, when r < n; that is, when some constituents do not answer truthfully, the
condence intervals do not coincide. In this case, the di¤erence between condence
intervals w and w0 for a poll having outcome k is proportional to an expression we
denote by  (k) : That is,




(n  2 (n  r)) + 2n2k2 + n3r   8knr2

  (k) :





0@1  2r   nq






0@1 + 2r   nq
(n  r)2 + 3r2
1A ;
notice that k0 < n2 < k1:
As we show in Proposition 9, the realized outcome of the poll determines whether
the conventional condence interval overstates or understates the precision of poll
information. In particular, as Figure 3 illustrates, when relatively few (or relatively
many) centrists report mi = 1, the conventional condence interval is wider than the
adjusted condence interval the precision of the poll information is understated.
The converse is true when a moderate number of centrists report mi = 1: The proof
of the following proposition is contained in the Appendix.
Proposition 9 For large polls of size n, the conventional condence interval is strictly
wider than the adjusted condence interval for outcomes k < k0 or k > k1 and con-
versely for outcomes k 2 [k0; k1] :
The intuition underlying the results of Proposition 9 is straightforward. Suppose
the pollster observes extreme realizations of k. The pollster is more likely to observe
extreme values for k when the sample size is large than the same number of extreme
values for k when the sample size is small. The sample size is overstated when the
pollster does not recognize the e¤ects of strategic polling behavior. Therefore, when
the pollster observes extreme realizations of k, the pollster can less condently draw
inferences about the unknown population parameter . Consequently, we observe
21
w w0 > 0. Alternatively, suppose the pollster observes a moderate value for k. In this
case, the pollster can more condently draw inferences about the unknown population
parameter  when the sample size is large than when it is small. Because the sample
size is overstated when the pollster does not recognize the e¤ects of strategic polling
behavior, we nd w   w0 < 0.
6.2 Polls with Random Sampling
Next, we turn to polls with random sampling. As we shall see below, the statistical
properties of bias and misstated condence intervals arise in a similar fashion under
this framework as they did under a poll with stratied sampling. In other words,
the distortions to the statistical properties of polls are a general consequence of the
presence of strategic incentives and not merely a by-product of the particular modeling
assumptions used earlier.
Bias
The sample mean of a poll consisting of n constituents having outcome k is ̂ =
k=n. Recall that in equilibrium a polled constituent is message mi is a Bernoulli










E [mi] = (qc + qr) ;
and this is a biased estimator of  provided qc 6= 1:Thus, we have shown
Proposition 10 For large polls, the sample mean ̂ is biased.
By recognizing that constituentsbehave strategically, it is possible to obtain an






















((qc + qr)n  nqr)
= :
Hence, to obtain a statistic ~ that is an unbiased estimator of , two adjustments to
the conventional sample mean ̂ of the poll are needed: rst, one needs to reduce the
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outcome of the poll by the expected number of right-wing constituents; second, the
sample size needs to be adjusted to account for the expected fraction of those polled
who are centrists.
Condence intervals.
A poll under a centrist-extremist equilibrium (qc; qr) will produce reported re-
sults that are Bernoulli distributed with parameter  , where  = qc + qr. When






. We are interested not in the parameter  , however, but in the









= ~ as dened above. Using the delta method (see
























Comparing the statistical properties of the estimator for  taking account of strate-
gic e¤ects to the usual classical estimator, two points are worth noting: First, the
classical estimator produces biased estimates of . Second, the variance of the clas-
sical estimator ̂ understates the variance of the estimator ~. Under the classical
model, the variance of the underlying (Bernoulli) distribution is scaled down by n; in
contrast, accounting for strategic e¤ects means that a poll of size n exhibits greater
variance than it would in the absence of strategic e¤ects; this e¤ect is reected in the
correction of the variance by dividing by (qc)
2. Notice that when truth-telling is an
equilibrium (i.e., qc = 1), the properties of the two estimators coincide. At the other
extreme, when qc approaches zero;the variance of the ~ estimator becomes innite
because the poll results reveal little about the state, , in this case. By correcting
the estimator and adjusting the variance, one can use poll results from a centrist-
extremist equilibrium to construct appropriate condence intervals or margin of
error for the parameter of interest, .
7 Extensions
Up until now, we have shown that, even though constituents have incentives to re-
spond to polling questions strategically once the poll size is su¢ ciently large, the poll
still performs well in the sense of aggregating information. To arrive at this conclu-
sion, we made several key assumptions. First, we assumed that there was su¢ cient
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exibility on the part of the policy maker that the set of policies that might be chosen
following the poll could be represented by a continuum. Second, we assumed that the
ideological distribution of the constituents could also be represented by a continuum
with the policy maker representing the median ideology. In this section, we relax
these two assumptions and explore the properties of the model.
7.1 Polls and Elections
The rst variation is a comparison between policy making via an elected representa-
tive who uses polls to glean information versus direct democracy such as the use of
a referendum to make policy. A recent famous example of this was when Governor
Arnold Schwarzenegger went to the people to implement policies related to the
resolution of budget impasses rather than working with the California state legisla-
ture. Of course, the policy outcomes associated with this type strategy are often
uncertain all four of the ballot measures placed by the governor were defeated by
voters in the 2004 referenda. A natural question is how the policy performance of
polls di¤ers from that of elections, which might be thought of as referenda.
To allow for a meaningful comparison between policy making using polls and
referenda, we amend the earlier model such that the policy maker is restricted to
choosing one of two possible policies. When then compare the policy response under
circumstances where the policy is chosen by the policy maker following a poll versus
where the policy is selected by "the people" via majority rule in a referendum. Before
proceeding with the analysis, it is useful to reect on the di¤erence between the two
mechanisms. Like elections, polls have the feature that they provide a mechanism
for aggregating private information. Indeed, a poll with a policy maker who has
the median ideology and whose policy choice space is binary seems similar to a two-
candidate election with majority rule. An important di¤erence, however, is that in
a poll the policy maker chooses the optimal action after observing the poll outcome
whereas in an election the rule for choosing the winning candidate is xed. In other
words, the policy maker cannot commit to a policy rule in advance of the polling
outcome while in election, the policy maker, in e¤ect, can commit to a policy rule
as a function of the response of constituents. As we shall see below, the absence of
commitment has important e¤ects on the informational properties and equilibrium
policy response of a poll compared to an elections.
We amend the model of polls with random sampling as follows: suppose the
policy space is given by y 2 fy0; y1g where 0  y0 < y1  1. Further, to ensure
the policy choice is non-trivial under truth-telling, suppose E [js = 0]  y1+y0
2
<
E [js = 1] :The following denition proves useful:
Denition 1 The policy maker is said to follow a k rule if policy y0 is selected when
the support of the poll is less than or equal to k and policy y1 otherwise.
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In a referendum, the k rule is committed to in advance. for instance, under ma-
jority rule where y0 represents the status quo policy, the vote amounts to committing





rule. It is straightforward to show (and also follows from Austen-Smith
and Banks, 1996) that truth-telling is not an equilibrium in the referendum model;
thus, we study the analog of a centrist-extremist equilibrium for the case of a referen-
dum. The referendum model is closely related to Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997)
and shares many of the same properties.17 In particular, using a proof along the same
lines as their existence proof, we can show that
Proposition 11 A centrist-extremist voting equilibrium exists.
Next, we contrast the results from a referendum with those of polls. We rst
show that a key feature of the model of polls with random sampling that truth-
telling is never an equilibrium for a su¢ ciently large poll continues to hold in the
amended model. The intuition is as follows: The endogenous k rule followed by the
policy maker occurs where she is almost indi¤erent between policy y0 and policy y1
conditional on the information in the poll. When the poll becomes su¢ ciently large,
this means that it is likely that the true value of the state is such that the policy
maker is indeed indi¤erent between the two possible policy choices. This, in turn,
implies that constituents with ideologies even slightly to the right of the policy maker
will strictly prefer y1 even given the signal s = 0 and hence distort their response to
the poll. The incentives are similar for constituents with ideologies just to the left of
the policy maker. It then follows that truth-telling is not an equilibrium. Formally,
Proposition 12 Truth-telling is never an equilibrium for a su¢ ciently large poll.
A common intuition might suggest that a symmetric centrist-extremist equilib-
rium in a poll leads to policy outcomes similar to a referendum under majority rule
when the policy space is binary. Intuitively, if there are, on average, the same number
of left-wing extremists as right-wing extremists, then when the majority of centrists
indicate having received s = 1;then one might expect this would lead to a change in
the policy choice of the policy maker. That is, one might imagine that a symmetric
centrist-extremist equilibrium endogenously leads the policy maker to adopt a ma-
jority k rule. As we show below, this, intuition fails: when the prior beliefs of the
policy maker su¢ ciently favor one policy ex ante, it might require a supermajority of
evidence to lead to a policy change.
Remark 2 An equilibrium in a referendum under a given k rule is generally not an
equilibrium in a poll.
17Our assumptions are not identical to the Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) model. Hence, we
cannot immediately invoke their results for the referendum model. The di¤erences in the assump-
tions, however, do not appear to qualitatively change the results.
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An equilibrium in an election consists of a k rule and a resulting pair of equilibrium
cutpoints (bl; br) :For this to be an equilibrium in a poll, this further requires that
E [v (; 0) j hn; ki]  0  E [v (; 0) j hn; k + 1i]
In general, there is no reason for this additional condition to hold.
In particular, suppose that y0 = 0 and y1 = 1; further, let n = 5,  = 2,  = 1, and
suppose the constituentsideology is uniformly distributed on [ 1; 1]. In this case,
the prior beliefs of the policy maker favor policy y1: While there is a non-degenerate
centrist-extremist equilibrium in a referendum under the majority rule (and indeed
under any k rule), There is no non-degenerate centrist extremist equilibrium in a poll
where the policy maker endogenously chooses the majority rule.
One might suspect, however, that given the prior beliefs of the decision maker,
one would need to modify the k rule such that there is su¢ cient evidence of a low
state to induce a policy change. That is, one might imagine that, while the example
fails for a majority k rule, an equilibrium might arise under a supermajority k rule.18
This turns out not to be the case either. Indeed, in the example above, an endogenous
k rule precludes the possibility of meaningful information revelation on the part of
any constituents in a poll.
In particular, it is straightforward to verify that, in the example above, there is
does not exist a non-degenerate centrist-extremist equilibrium in a poll with binary
policies. In other words, the unique centrist-extremist equilibrium for the above
parameters consists of babbling on the part of all constituents together with a totally
unresponsive policy rule.
We have shown that,
Proposition 13 Under binary policies, a referendum has a non-degenerate centrist-
extremist equilibrium for all k rules while meaningful information revelation need not
arise in a poll under any k rule.
An immediate implication of the proposition is that the distribution of policy
outcomes occurring under a given state when a referendum is held to determine policy
will typically di¤er from those of a poll. For the example above, in all states, the policy
outcome under a poll is policy y1 whereas under a referendum, policy y0 is chosen
some fraction of the time. From the point of view of the policy maker, therefore,
it would be better to commit to a k rule in advance (i.e., to hold a referendum)
rather than to retain the power to choose policy after learning the results of a poll.
In short, when the policy space is binary, the absence of commitment implied by
choosing policies using polls is welfare reducing from the perspective of the policy
maker compared to a referendum.
18In this case, a supermajority amounts to a k rule where k < 2 since evidence in favor of a low
state is needed to overturn the priors of the decision maker.
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7.2 Binary ideologies
Our next variation amends the model of polls with random sampling to include the
possibility that there are no constituents with ideologies near those of the policy
maker. Recall that, when the ideology of the constituents is continuously distrib-
uted around the policy maker, who has the median ideology, information aggregates
because the pollster is able to infer the underlying state from the constituents with
ideologies close to that of the policy maker. To highlight the sensitivity of the equi-
librium outcome to the ideological distribution of the constituents and how this dis-
tribution determines whether information aggregations occurs, we focus on a binary
ideology specication. In this specication, constituents either have left-wing pref-
erences ( b) or right-wing preferences (b) while the policy maker is stuck between
the two ideological camps. This situation might arise for a particular issue where
the polity is ideologically polarized compared to the policy maker, i.e., where no con-
stituent has an ideology close to that of the policy maker. We showed that, when the
ideological distribution was binary, that is bi = f b; bg with equal probability, the
largest size poll supporting truth telling was given by n = n as dened in Proposition
2. Further, we continue to suppose that individuals su¤er quadratic losses associated
with the deviation of the chosen policy from an individuals ideal policy.
In the next proposition, which is proved in the appendix, we show that n represents
an upper bound on the number of constituents reporting truthfully in any centrist-
extremist equilibrium. In other words, the interaction of information and ideology
leads to a situation where information does not fully aggregate in polls regardless of
poll size. Formally,
Proposition 14 In the quadratic loss with binary ideology specication, there does
not exist a centrist-extremist equilibrium where information fully aggregates. Specif-








constituents truthfully reveal their signals
in any centrist-extremist equilibrium.
Although this analysis pertains to the case where ideology of constituents is binary,
one could readily generalize Proposition 14 to a situation where there is a di¤erence
of at least b > 0 between the ideology of the policy maker and the ideology of any of
the constituents. In other words, for any ideological distribution with the property
that there is zero mass on the interval ( b; b), full information aggregation will not
occur. This nding contrasts with our earlier nding that information aggregates.
While this extension of the model is interesting in highlighting the sensitivity of
the information aggregation results to alternative assumptions, the binary ideology
model would seem to be a rather poor description of reality. After all, why should it
be that the policy maker holds ideological views that are far from those of other
constituents in the polity? How did such a policy maker get elected in the rst place?
Why are her views so di¤erent? This extension is useful mainly on a theoretical basis
for understanding models of polling, but probably does not reect the institutional
reality within which polling occurs.
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8 Conclusions
The inuence of poll results on policy outcomes has a long history. For instance,
President Richard Nixon decided to ban oil drilling o¤ the California coast largely
on the basis of poll information (Green 2002). Polled constituents are aware of this
connection between their poll responses and policy outcomes, and hence, will be
strategic in their responses. In determining their responses to a poll, constituents are
inuenced both by their underlying ideology as well as specic information they have
about the desirability of various policies, such as the ecological e¤ects of oil drilling
o¤ the California coast. Consequently, poll answers will reect the interaction of
ideology and information in the sense that respondents might shadetheir answers
in the direction of their ideology, thereby distorting their information.
We study equilibrium responses to polls in the presence of constituents infor-
mational and ideological motives. We show that when constituents ideologies are
relatively homogeneous and the poll is su¢ ciently small, poll respondents reveal their
information truthfully. In contrast, as the size of the poll increases, we nd the
gains to respondents from shadingtheir information in the direction of their ide-
ology dominate. As a consequence, constituents have an incentive to distort their
information even in polls with modest sample sizes.
Given that truth-telling is not an equilibrium once the sample size of the poll is
su¢ ciently large, we examine whether polls aggregate information under non truth-
telling strategies. On one hand, when the ideology of constituents is similar to that
of the policy-maker, we show full information aggregation can arise in an equilibrium
where those polled endogenously sort themselves into centrists, who answer truthfully,
and extremists, who do not. As the sample size increases, the fraction of centrists
in the poll declines and indeed vanishes in the limit. Nevertheless, the number of
centrists increases with the sample size of the poll and then information aggregates
in the limit. On the other hand, information aggregation breaks down when the
policy maker is ideologically isolated from her constituents.
An important practical implication of our results is that the use of classical sta-
tistics to derive conclusion from poll data can lead to seriously awed inference about
the underlying environment. Indeed,when poll respondents are strategic the sample
mean is typically not an unbiased estimator of the parameter of interest and the mar-
gin of error is always understated. We propose amendments to the standard classical
statistics to correct for strategic e¤ects and therefore allow meaningful inference.
Finally, we compare polls to elections. While votes in an two candidate election
will typically convey some of the information held by constituents, this need not be
the case in a poll. In contrast, when policies are determined following a poll and
the policy space is constrained to be binary, constituents may be unable to convey




Proof of Lemma 1:
Suppose to the contrary that y (k + 1)  y (k) : Since y (k + 1) is optimal when a
poll has outcome k + 1, it follows from equation (1) that:Z 1
0
U1 (y (k + 1) ; )
g (j hn; k + 1i)
g (j hn; ki) g (j hn; ki) d = 0: (4)
Furthermore, there exists a unique state,  = k+1, where U1 (y (k + 1) ; ) = 0. Using
this fact, we can rewrite the left-hand side of equation (4) asZ k+1
0
U1 (y (k + 1) ; )
g (j hn; k + 1i)




U1 (y (k + 1) ; )
g (j hn; k + 1i)




U1 (y (k + 1) ; )
g (k+1j hn; k + 1i)
g (k+1j hn; ki)




U1 (y (k + 1) ; )
g (k+1j hn; k + 1i)
g (k+1j hn; ki)
g (j hn; ki) d
=
g (k+1j hn; k + 1i)
g (k+1j hn; ki)
Z 1
0
U1 (y (k + 1) ; ) g (j hn; ki) d;
where the strict inequality follows from two facts: First, when  < k+1; U1 (y (k + 1) ; ) <
0 and when  > k+1; U1 (y (k + 1) ; ) > 0: Second, since the posterior beliefs of the
policy maker are Beta distributed, the family of posterior densities fg (j hn; ki)g satis-









Finally, we claim that
g (k+1j hn; k + 1i)
g (k+1j hn; ki)
Z 1
0
U1 (y (k + 1) ; ) g (j hn; ki) d  0:
The likelihood ratiog(k+1jhn;k+1i)
g(k+1jhn;ki) is positive. Further, the strict concavity of the policy
makers payo¤ function implies that for all y  y (k) ;Z 1
0
U1 (y; ) g (j hn; ki) d  0:
Since, by assumption, y (k + 1)  y (k), then
R 1
0
U1 (y (k + 1) ; ) g (j hn; ki)  0:
Therefore, Z 1
0
U1 (y (k + 1) ; )
g (j hn; k + 1i)
g (j hn; ki) g (j hn; ki) d > 0;
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which contradicts equation (4).
Proof of Lemma 2:
To establish the result, we will show that for any truthful sequence, kn;
lim
n!1
g (j hn; kni)





g (j hn; kni)









t(kn+1)+ 1 (1  t)n (kn+1)+ 1 dtR
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+ kn + 1)  (n+    kn   1)
1
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where we use the fact that limn!1 knn = : Since limn!1
g(jhn;kni)
g(jhn;kn+1i) = 1 for all , the
optimal policy following a poll having outcome kn converges to that of the optimal
policy following a poll having outcome kn + 1. Thus, for any " > 0; there exists a
su¢ ciently large n such that
y (k + 1)  y (k) < ":
This completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 2:
Consider a right-biased constituent with ideology bi = b: Clearly, when this con-
stituent receives a signal si = 1; he can do no better than to report truthfully. For
truth-telling to be incentive compatible, a constituent i receiving a signal si = 0 must






sj = kjsi = 0
!Z 1
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    : (5)
If the right-hand side of equation (5) is negative, no poll (or equivalently an n = 0 size
poll) is consistent with a truth-telling equilibrium. If the right-hand side of equation
(5) is positive, then, since the size of the poll must be integer valued, the largest poll








This completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 3
Given the above construction, we need to establish that no polled constituent
can protably deviate. First, consider the incentive constraint of a centrist with
ideology b > 0: For truth-telling to be optimal requires that, having received the
signal s = 0;the payo¤ to that constituent is greater by reporting m = 0 than from
reporting m = 1: That is,X
Pr [hn  1; ki js = 0] (y (k + 1)  y (k))
 (y (k + 1) + y (k)  2E [j hn  1; ki ; s = 0]  2b)
 0
Recall that optimality on the part of the policy maker requires that y (k) = E [j hn; ki]
for all k:
We make the following claim:
Claim: In a centrist-extremist equilibrium under stratied polling, for any con-
stituent who is a centrist with signal s = 0; it is the case that E [j hn  1; ki ; s = 0] =
E [j hn; ki] :
To establish the claim, notice that















tk  (1  t)c 1 (k ) (1  t) t 1 (1  t) 1 dt
=
k   + 
c+ + 
= E [j hn; ki]
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Hence, the incentive constraint of a centrist with signal s = 0 reduces toX
Pr [hn  1; ki js = 0] (y (k + 1)  y (k)) (y (k + 1)  y (k)  2b)  0
Clearly, this constraint is most binding for the right-most centrist. Substituting for b
using the index rj;X
Pr [hnj   1; ki js = 0]

1





nj   2 (nj   rj) + + 
  2






Pr [hnj   1; ki js = 0]

1





nj   2 (nj   rj) + + 
  2

2 (rj   1)  (nj   1)
(nj   1)

Notice that the sign of this expression depends solely on the sign of
1
nj   2 (nj   rj) + + 
  2





Substituting for nj and rj this expression reduces to zero. Hence, no centrist with
signal s = 0 can protably deviate.
Next, consider a centrist with signal s = 1 and ideology b < 0: The incentive
constraint is X
k
Pr [hn  1; ki js = 1] (y (k + 1)  y (k))
 (2E [j hn  1; ki ; s = 1]  y (k + 1)  y (k) + 2b)
 0
Claim: In a centrist-extremist equilibrium under stratied polling, for any con-
stituent who is a centrist with signal s = 1; it is the case that E [j hn  1; ki ; s = 1] =
E [j hn; k + 1i] :
To establish the claim, notice that














tk  (1  t)c 1 (k ) t t 1 (1  t) 1 dt
=
k + 1  + 
c+ + 
= E [j hn; k + 1i]
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Hence, the incentive constraint of a centrist with signal s = 1 reduces toX
k
Pr [hn  1; ki js = 1] (y (k + 1)  y (k)) (y (k + 1)  y (k) + 2b)  0
and, by symmetry, this constraint is also satised.
Now consider a right-wing extremist signal s = 0: His incentive constraint isX
Pr [hn  1; ki js = 0] (y (k + 1)  y (k))
 (y (k + 1) + y (k)  2E [j hn  1; ki ; s = 0]  2b)
< 0
Claim: In a centrist-extremist equilibrium under stratied polling, for any con-
stituent who is a right-wing extremist with signal s = 0; it is the case that
E [j hn  1; ki ; s = 0] < E [j hn; ki] :
To establish the claim, notice that
E [j hn  1; ki ; s = 0] =
R 1
0
k ( 1) (1  )c (k ( 1)) (1  )  (1  ) 1 dR 1
0
tk ( 1) (1  t)c (k ( 1)) (1  t) t 1 (1  t) 1 dt
=
k   + + 1
c+ +  + 1
Dene the function
 (z) =
k   + + z
c+ +  + z
and notice that this is increasing in z: Then
E [j hn; ki] =  (0)
<  (1)
= E [j hn  1; ki ; s = 0]
Hence, it follows thatX
Pr [hn  1; ki js = 0] (y (k + 1)  y (k))
 (y (k + 1) + y (k)  2E [j hn  1; ki ; s = 0]  2b)
<
X
Pr [hn  1; ki js = 0] (y (k + 1)  y (k)) (y (k + 1)  y (k)  2b)
< 0
where the last inequality follows from the fact that right-wing extremists have higher
values of b than do centrists. Hence, there is no protable deviation.
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Pr [hn  1; ki js = 1] (y (k + 1)  y (k))
 (2E [j hn  1; ki ; s = 1]  y (k + 1)  y (k) + 2b)
< 0
Claim: In a centrist-extremist equilibrium under stratied polling, for any con-
stituent who is a left-wing extremist with signal s = 1; it is the case thatE [j hn  1; ki ; s = 1] <
E [j hn; k + 1i] :
Substituting














tk  (1  t)c (k ) t t 1 (1  t) 1 dt
=
k   + + 1
c+ +  + 1
Next, notice that
E [j hn  1; ki ; s = 1] = k   + + 1
c+ +  + 1
<
k   + + 1
c+ + 
= E [j hn; k + 1i]
Hence, it follows thatX
k
Pr [hn  1; ki js = 1] (y (k + 1)  y (k))




Pr [hn  1; ki js = 1] (y (k + 1)  y (k)) (y (k + 1)  y (k) + 2b)
< 0
where the last inequality follows from the fact that left-wing extremists have lower
values of b than do centrists. Hence, there is no protable deviation.
Proof of Proposition 5:
The proof relies on the following series of Lemmas.
Lemma 3 E [j hn; k + 1i] < E [j hn  1; ki ; s = 1]
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Proof of Lemma 3:
Fix the strategy of all individuals at (qc; qr) : Suppose that the policy maker
conducts two polls, one consisting of a single individual and one consisting of n   1
individuals and receives 1 support in the rst poll and k support in the second poll.
Clearly, this is equivalent to holding a single poll consisting of n individuals and
receiving k + 1 support. Hence
E [j hn; k + 1i] = E [j hn  1; ki ; h1; 1i]
Next, suppose that the policy maker learned that, in conducting the poll with a
single individual, that individual was telling the truth. Then the change to the policy
makers posterior would be higher than if she were uncertain about the truthfulness
of the individual. Hence
E [j hn  1; ki ; s = 1] > E [j hn  1; ki ; h1; 1i]
This proves the claim. 
Lemma 4 E [j hn; ki] > E [j hn  1; ki ; s = 0]
Proof of Lemma 4:
Fix the strategy of all individuals at (qc; qr) : Suppose that the policy maker
conducts two polls, one consisting of a single individual and one consisting of n   1
individuals and receives 0 support in the rst poll and k support in the second poll.
Clearly, this is equivalent to holding a single poll consisting of n individuals and
receiving k support. Hence
E [j hn; ki] = E [j hn  1; ki ; h1; 0i]
Next, suppose that the policy maker learned that, in conducting the poll with a
single individual, that individual was telling the truth. Then the change to the policy
makers posterior would be greater than if she were uncertain about the truthfulness
of the individual. Hence
E [j hn  1; ki ; s = 0] < E [j hn  1; ki ; h1; 0i]
This proves the claim. 
Lemma 5 In any centrist-extremist equilibrium, a constituent with index bi is a right-
wing extremist only if bi > 0. Likewise, a constituent with index bi is a left-wing
extremist only if bi < 0:
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Proof of Lemma 5:
Suppose not. Consider the case of a constituent with index bi > 0 who is supposed
to be a left-wing extremist. Then, when si = 1;it must be the case that
n 1X
k=0
Pr [hn  1; ki jsi = 1] (E [j hn; k + 1i]  E [j hn; ki])
 ( E [j hn; k + 1i]  E [j hn; ki] + 2E [j hn  1; ki ; s = 1] + 2bi) < 0
However, since
E [j hn  1; ki ; s = 1]  E [j hn; k + 1i]  E [j hn; ki]
it then follows that, for all k;




Pr [hn  1; ki jsi = 1] (E [j hn; k + 1i]  E [j hn; ki])
 ( E [j hn; k + 1i]  E [j hn; ki] + 2E [j hn  1; ki ; s = 1] + 2bi)  0
which is a contradiction. The proof for the reverse case is identical. 
From this lemma, we may then conclude that as qc ! 0; qr ! 12 . Clearly, as
qc ! 1; qr ! 0:
We are now in a position to prove the main result.
First, x br. Suppose that bl =  1. Substituting this value for bl yields
( y (k + 1)  y (k) + 2E [j hn  1; ki ; s = 1] + 2bl)
= ( y (k + 1)  y (k) + 2E [j hn  1; ki ; s = 1]  2) < 0
because y (k + 1) ; y (k) ; E [j hn  1; ki ; s = 1] > 0. Because (y (k + 1)  y (k)) > 0,
it follows that the left-hand side of (3) is negative. Now suppose bl = 0. Then
substituting this value for bl yields
( y (k + 1)  y (k) + 2E [j hn  1; ki ; s = 1] + 2bl)
=  E [j hn; k + 1i]  E [j hn; ki] + 2E [j hn  1; ki ; s = 1]
> 0
where the inequality follows from the fact that E [j hn; ki] < E [j hn; k + 1i] <
E [j hn  1; ki ; s = 1] established in Lemma 3. Thus, the left-hand side of (3) is
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positive. Finally, since the left-hand side of (3) is continuous in bl it follows from the
intermediate value theorem that there exists a value for bl such that
n 1X
k=0
(Pr [hn  1; ki js = 1] (E [j hn; k + 1i]  E [j hn; ki])
 ( E [j hn; k + 1i]  E [j hn; ki] + 2E [j hn  1; ki ; s = 1] + 2bl))
= 0
Second, x bl. When br = 0, then
(y (k + 1) + y (k)  2E [j hn  1; ki ; s = 0]  2br)
= y (k + 1) + y (k)  2E [j hn  1; ki ; s = 0]
> 0
because E [j hn; k + 1i] > E [j hn; ki] > E [j hn  1; ki ; s = 0], which was estab-
lished in Lemma 4. It then follows that the left-hand side of (2) is positive. When
br = 1, then
(y (k + 1) + y (k)  2E [j hn  1; ki ; s = 0]  2br)
= y (k + 1) + y (k)  2E [j hn  1; ki ; s = 0]  2
< 0
and the left-hand side of (2) is negative. Finally, since the IC constraint is continuous




(Pr [hn  1; ki js = 0] (E [j hn; k + 1i]  E [j hn; ki])

 
E [j hn; k + 1i] + E [j hn; ki]  2E [j hn  1; ki ; s = 0]  2F 1 (1  qr)

= 0
Combining the rst and second arguments together with Kakutanis xed point
theorem implies the existence of a centrist-extremist equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 6:
Consider a convergent subsequence of fqc;ng (note that since fqc;ng is bounded,
such a subsequence exists). Call this subsequence fqc;nig with subsequence limit point
L. We claim that for such subsequences, the subsequence limit equals L = 0. To see
this, suppose to the contrary that the limit of a convergent subsequence was
lim
n!1
fqc;nig = L > 0
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(1  fqr;nig   fqc;nig) <
1
2
Suppose, without loss of generality that limn!1 fqr;nig < 12 . It then follows that the
associated bound on the ideology of the right-most centrist satises:
lim
n!1
fbr;nig = br > 0











(E [j hn  1; ki ; s = 0]  ) = 0

= 1
Therefore, Pr (limn!1 (E [j hn; ki]  E [j hn  1; ki ; s = 0]) = 0) = 1. The relevant








k=0 Pr [hn  1; ki js = 0] (E [j hn; k + 1i]  E [j hn; ki])
= 0;
which is a contradicts the fact that br > 0:
Thus, we have shown that every convergent subsequence of fqc;ng converges to
zero. It then follows from Rudin (1976, 51) that if every subsequence of fqc;ng con-
verges to q, then fqc;ng converges to q. This result implies fqc;ng converges to zero.

Proof of Proposition 7:
Suppose not. In that case
lim
n!1
n fqc;ng = L <1
Recall that the incentive compatibility condition for the right-most centrist may be
written as
F 1 (1  qr) =
Pn 1
k=0 Pr [hn  1; ki js = 0] (E [j hn; k + 1i]  E [j hn; ki])
 (E [j hn; k + 1i] + E [j hn; ki]  2E [j hn  1; ki ; s = 0])
2
Pn 1
k=0 Pr [hn  1; ki js = 0] (E [j hn; k + 1i]  E [j hn; ki])
Since limn!1 fqc;ng = 0 then limn!1 fqr;ng = 12 (from the symmetry of F ) and hence
the left-hand side of the above expression equals zero.
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Since there are only a nite number of centrists in the limit, a given constituents








(E [j hn; k + 1i] + E [j hn; ki]  2E [j hn  1; ki ; s = 0]) > 0






(E [j hn; k + 1i] + E [j hn; ki]  2E [j hn  1; ki ; s = 0])







which is a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 14:
Suppose not. Then there exists a centrist-extremist equilibrium where c > n
constituents are centrists and the remainder are extremists. Suppose that constituent
i with ideology bi = b and signal si = 0 is a centrist. Then, under the putative
equilibrium, such a constituent must weakly prefer to reveal truthfully than to report






sj = kjsi = 0
!Z 1
0







sj = kjsi = 0
!Z 1
0
(U (y (k + 1) ; ; b)) g (j hn; ki) d:
























(n+ 1) + + 
;
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and, by the denition of n,
1






which is a contradiction.
An analogous contradiction is obtained for the case where constituent i has signal
si = 1 and ideology bi =  b: 
Proof of Proposition 9:
We rst establish that  is strictly increasing when k > n
2
and strictly decreasing
when k < n
2
; the case where k = n
2
is impossible since n is odd. Fix two values, k and
k0; and evaluate  () at these points. Notice that
 (k)   (k0) = 2
 
(n  r)2 + 3r2

(k0   k) (n  k   k0) :
When k < k0 < n
2
; then  (k)   (k0) < 0: When n
2
< k < k0, then  (k)   (k0) > 0:
Next, notice that, when k = r or n  r, then
 (k) = r (2r   n)3 > 0:
Hence, n  r < k0 < k1 < r:
Thus, we have shown that for k < k0 and k > k1;  (k) > 0 while for k 2 [k0; k1] ;
 (k)  0. 
Proof of Proposition 11:
Following Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997). Dene
v (; b) =   (y1   ( + b))2 + (y0   ( + b))2
= (y1   y0) (2b+ 2   y0   y1)
and notice that this is increasing linearly in  and b.
Next, observe that, for all ;
v (; 1) < 0
while
v (; 1) > 0
This implies that there is a set of types [ 1; 1 + "] from whom it is a dominant
strategy to report m = 0 and similarly a set of types [1  "; 1] for whom it is a
dominant strategy to always report m = 1.
40
Next, notice that the incentive compatibility condition is a type that solves
E [v (; b) j hn  1; ki ; s = 0;b] = 0
where b denotes a putative equilibrium strategy, (bl; br) ; played by all the other
constituents. Since v is increasing in b;then, together with the conditions on v (; 1)
and v (; 1) implies that there exists a single value br such that the above expression
is equal to zero.
Similarly, there exists a unique value bl such that
E [v (; b) j hn  1; ki ; s = 1;b] = 0
Finally, since the posterior distribution G (j hn  1; ki ; s;b) is stochastically ordered
in s;then bl < br:
Hence, for any putative equilibrium strategy b; there are a unique pair of cutpoints
that result. Next, dene the function that yields the unique set of cutpoints associated
with the putative equilibrium strategy b:Call this function  and notice that  : b!
b: Furthermore, it is apparent that  is continuous in the vector b (from the Theorem
of the Maximum). Hence, by Kakutanis xed point theorem, this mapping has a
xed point which comprises a non-degenerate centrist-extremist equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 12
Let knpiv denote the k rule used for a poll of size n: It follows from the optimality
















To see this, notice that, under the denition of knpiv;
knpiv + a
n+ + 
 y0 + y1
2
<
































Finally, since, for all n
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